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Abstract
Prior to the 2014–2015 Ebola outbreak, infection prevention and control (IPC) activities in Liberian healthcare facilities
were basic. There was no national IPC guidance, nor dedicated staff at any level of government or healthcare facility
(HCF) to ensure the implementation of best practices. Efforts to improve IPC early in the outbreak were ad hoc and
messaging was inconsistent. In September 2014, at the height of the outbreak, the national IPC Task Force was
established with a Ministry of Health (MoH) mandate to coordinate IPC response activities. A steering group of the Task
Force, including representatives of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United States Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), supported MoH leadership in implementing standardized messaging and IPC training
for the health workforce. This structure, and the activities implemented under this structure, played a crucial role in the
implementation of IPC practices and successful containment of the outbreak. Moving forward, a nationwide culture of
IPC needs to be maintained through this governance structure in Liberia’s health system to prevent and respond to
future outbreaks.
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Background
The outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West
Africa, unprecedented in both size and duration, appears
in its terminal stages as of the last quarter of 2015.
Historically, Ebola outbreaks typically last no more than
3–4 months from the time of identification and involve,
at a maximum, hundreds of patients. This outbreak,
affecting Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, resulted in
greater than 28,000 reported cases, with over a third of
these from Liberia [1].
The first cases in the region were identified in Guinea
in March 2014 and subsequently spread across the
border to Liberia when a patient, infected in Guinea,
presented for treatment at Foya Borma Hospital, along
the border in Lofa County. This first wave of transmis-
sion resulted in six EVD infections and demonstrated a
national vulnerability when one of these patients trav-
elled to Margibi County, 400 km away [2]. A second
wave occurred when a patient presented to the same
hospital in Lofa County on 23 May 2014, after travelling
from Sierra Leone. From this time, transmission intensi-
fied with all counties soon affected [3].
Early in the outbreak, several clusters of EVD were
reported in healthcare facilities throughout the country
[4, 5]. These clusters occurred in part because of poor
knowledge and adherence to basic infection prevention
and control (IPC) practices, and contributed to EVD
transmission among patients and healthcare workers
(HCWs) within the healthcare facility and surrounding
communities. By March 2015, 288 HCW infections had
been reported in Liberia [6]. As stories spread about the
risk of healthcare-associated EVD, many HCWs were
afraid to return to work. This resulted in a rapid break-
down of essential health services, with consequent rami-
fications for endemic infectious diseases (e.g. measles,
malaria, HIV, tuberculosis) and non-communicable
disease-related care, such as diabetes and maternal
health [7].
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Early outbreak response efforts demanded a new level
of intensity once the scale and further potential for
spread was realized. The incidence of cases began falling
in October 2014 and on 9 May 2015, Liberia was de-
clared Ebola-free by the World Health Organization
(WHO). Although another cluster was identified on
29 June 2015, this was quickly contained [8] and
Liberia was again declared free of Ebola transmission
on 3 September 2015. Liberia ultimately documented
over 10,000 cases, including more than 4,000 deaths.
The purpose of this commentary is to describe specific
efforts critical to the success of the IPC response in
Liberia. Due to the rapid nature of the response, some of
the information reported is based upon unpublished
data or personal observations.
Discussion
Health service delivery and healthcare workers during the
outbreak
By September 2014, the number of Ebola Treatment
Unit (ETU) beds needed critically exceeded the number
of beds available. Because ETUs were primarily being
established in response to local clusters, new cases
would frequently present in areas distant from this
structured care. This logistic difficulty of providing ap-
propriately located ETU beds in adequate numbers was
a challenge for those managing the response as patients
wanted care close to home. Patients with symptoms of
Ebola were presenting to clinics, healthcare centers and
hospitals for care; therefore, HCWs all over the country
had to enhance triage practices to facilitate the urgent
identification and isolation of suspected cases, and pro-
vide potentially lifesaving care until they could be safely
transferred to an ETU. With many HCFs closed and
patients turned away from ETUs that were full, commu-
nity leaders requested IPC guidance and support for
community-based care.
IPC activities early in the outbreak
Initial engagement by international and local IPC spe-
cialists with Liberian HCWs primarily focused on dispel-
ling myths about the origins of the disease: Ebola was
real; it was an infectious disease; and lives could be
saved with supportive care. HCWs needed the reassur-
ance that they could safely provide care with the right
personal protective equipment (PPE) and training. In the
early stage of the outbreak, IPC practices in non-ETU
healthcare facilities in Liberia were limited. Although
several organizations provided some IPC training, there
was no national strategy or appropriate oversight at the
national, county or facility level. As a result, messaging
was inconsistent and coordination ad hoc. As the out-
break escalated it became clear that variations in mes-
sages from different organizations were confusing.
Additionally, HCWs were being trained in the absence
of adequate supplies. This fragmented, poorly coordi-
nated system for IPC support underscored the need for
improved oversight and supervision nationally [9].
Establishing the national IPC Task Force
In September 2014, with transmission continuing un-
checked, the national IPC Task Force was established.
Chaired by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and supported
by international partners and local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), the Task Force rapidly developed
a national policy and guidelines for IPC practices in gen-
eral healthcare facilities. Leveraging partnerships with
organizations on the ground, the Task Force assumed
the role as the coordinating body for IPC activities in
Liberia, standardizing messages, overseeing resource
needs (especially PPE), establishing IPC standards, and
providing tools to assess compliance with these stan-
dards (Fig. 1). The Task Force also provided advice on
enhancing prevention measures in the community, such
as improving hygiene and infection prevention measures
in congregate settings [10]. The national IPC Task Force
succeeded in its primary goal, to speak as one voice
through an all-inclusive principle (community-based,
faith-based organizations, national and international
NGOs, etc.). Through technical oversight, regular com-
munication and strong partner relationships, the Task
Force helped drive several initiatives crucial to the
response.
The Keep Safe, Keep Serving (KSKS) programme
Over 2 weeks, a technical working group of the Task
Force developed numerous guidelines, posters and train-
ing materials adapted to the specific needs of non-ETUs
in Liberia at the time. The most significant issue re-
ported by HCWs was the need for consistent and
clear guidance for PPE. Based on fear for their per-
sonal safety, many HCWs felt conventional PPE was
inadequate. There were overt differences between
what was worn in ETUs and what was recommended
by the WHO and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC).
To enhance protection against EVD during the out-
break, instill confidence in Liberian HCWs and facilitate
rapid uptake of new guidance around the country, a
simple two-tier, risk-based PPE protocol was issued.
All HCWs were recommended to wear “basic PPE”
(consisting of face shield, gown and gloves) for all
low-risk clinical activities. In contrast, “enhanced PPE”
(basic PPE plus mask, head cover or hood, apron and a
second pair of gloves) was recommended for all HCWs
providing care to suspected or confirmed EVD patients,
or conducting other high-risk activities. Coveralls were an
option in the enhanced PPE guideline.
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Fig. 1 Timeline of the national IPC Task Force in Liberia: September 2014 to March 2015. The National IPC Task Force was established at the peak of the outbreak in September 2014. Specific














The work of the national IPC Task Force, its steering
committee and technical working group provided for a
system that would ensure a safe working environment
for all HCWs. The workflows were designed to facilitate
the rapid identification, isolation and care of patients
with EVD until they could be transferred to an ETU.
The programme branded “Keep Safe, Keep Serving”
(KSKS) also enabled restoration of preexisting health
services. The group had to provide recommendations for
situations with no evidence or clinical precedents, such
as care of Ebola patients in the community when ETU
bed capacity was exceeded [11].
By the end of September 2014, 120 healthcare workers
trained in the KSKS package travelled across the country
to train regional healthcare workers to implement these
guidelines. Based on MoH policy, all partners had to use
the standardized KSKS documents accessible via a
shared internet folder. This concerted approach allowed
for considerable reach throughout the health system; by
December 2014, over 4,000 HCWs had been trained in
the KSKS curriculum and these posters and training
materials were evident in facilities throughout the
country.
Within months of establishing its “flagship” KSKS
programme, the national IPC Task Force was increasingly
recognized for its authority and influence in Liberia. The
Task Force began to expand its scope of activities to facili-
tate the implementation of best IPC practices. To help
translate KSKS didactic sessions into practice, role play
simulations testing triage, isolation, PPE use and environ-
mental cleaning were introduced to complement training.
The Task Force also coordinated with the relevant lo-
gisticians to help inform the national supply chain and
facilitate distribution of PPE to all non-ETU healthcare
facilities so that KSKS policies could be implemented.
To enhance local capacity building, the Task Force ini-
tially trained and deployed 21 specialists in IPC, termed
technical assistants (TAs), into the healthcare teams of
14 counties to provide county-level IPC support. Among
other responsibilities, these embedded TAs worked with
county healthcare teams and partners to establish county
IPC committees, identify and train facility IPC specialists,
and ramp up triage and isolation practices through inten-
sified training and establishment of purpose-built tempor-
ary structures.
The sector approach
In January 2015, the “sector approach” was introduced
to intensify response efforts in areas with continued
active transmission in Montserrado County, the most
populous county in Liberia which contains the capital
city Monrovia [12]. Montserrado County was divided
into four geographic sectors, each with its own team.
Each team focused primarily on healthcare facility readi-
ness, with an emphasis on triage. Although the national
IPC Task Force continued to set priorities and establish
minimum standards, the implementation and monitor-
ing of these standards in Montserrado was delegated to
sector teams. These intensified efforts, implemented in a
“ring approach”, helped Liberia approach its goal of
“getting to zero” after identification of the cluster of 22
EVD infections near St Paul Bridge in Monrovia in
February 2015 [13].
Facing the challenges
The IPC component of the outbreak response had come
a long way. Early in the outbreak, the absence of IPC
practices contributed to a fertile setting for Ebola virus
transmission. Six months into the outbreak genuine stra-
tegic efforts were initiated, which were likely crucial in
Table 1 Some organizations involved in the IPC response in Liberia (in alphabetical order)
Accel Partners Action Contre La Faim African Union
AmeriCares American Refugees Committee Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Christian Health Association of Liberia Community Health and Education Social
Services, Liberia
Catholic Relief Services
Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe eHealth Africa EQUIP Liberia
International Committee of the Red Cross International Media Support International
Medical Corps
International Medical Corps
International Organization for Migration Johns Hopkins Program for International
Education in Gynecology and Obstetrics
John Snow, Inc.
Last Mile Health Médecins du Monde MENTOR Initiative
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency Médecins Sans Frontières Open Society Foundations
Oxfam Partners In Health Project Concern International
Save the Children United Nations Population Fund United Nations Children’s Fund
United States Agency for International Development World Food Programme World Health Organization
U Foundation
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ending the outbreak of EVD in Liberia. In 2015, the few
cases in March and the recurrence of the outbreak in
June and November were met with robust IPC responses
suggestive of a sustained capacity.
Practicing IPC in the absence of PPE is very difficult,
but additional logistic issues were also routinely encoun-
tered. Poor equipment and communications, lack of run-
ning water and reliable power, inadequate cleaning
supplies and often lack of pay to HCWs all increased the
challenge. The Liberian workforce needed international
technical support and this likewise represented a con-
stant challenge.
In Liberia, there were well over 30 organizations con-
tributing to the IPC response, including international
partners and local NGOs (Table 1). Of the NGOs already
operating in country few had technical expertise in IPC,
thus additional assistance was required. However,
lengthy deployment of IPC experts was often difficult
and resulted in high turnover with variability in the
training and expertise of international staff. At times this
compromised the availability of quality and consistent
support for the Liberian workforce. The risk of poor
continuity was alleviated by the sustained authority of
the IPC Task Force and the KSKS programme. Balancing
the expertise of international IPC professionals with the
experience of local organizations was crucial to the
response. Technical and interpersonal skills, as well as
the ability to compromise and adapt, were vital.
Conclusions
No single organization could respond as comprehen-
sively as was required during the 2014–2015 Ebola out-
break. IPC cannot be implemented in the absence of
complementary outbreak response teams managing
epidemiology, surveillance, laboratory, clinical cases, fu-
nerals, logistics and security, social mobilization and
health education, psychosocial support, and other key
functions. The WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN) deployed over 900 technical
experts to West Africa for this outbreak, and is well placed
to train and ultimately call upon a workforce, especially in
collaboration with its largest partners. To more rapidly
and efficiently respond to future outbreaks the profes-
sional development of, and prospective commitment
from, adequately trained experts from current and future
partners should be obtained.
In Liberia, poor IPC capacity was the primary driver of
EVD transmission within the health system [6]. While the
activities of the national IPC Task Force helped address
weaknesses in IPC during the outbreak, these improve-
ments need to be integrated into all aspects of healthcare
delivery and training of the workforce going forward. To
be successful, the national Keep Safe, Keep Serving
programme has to be restructured from its Ebola-specific
focus to emphasize the importance of standard precau-
tions in everyday practice. Healthcare workers need to re-
ceive continuous training on risk-based practices for high
priority diseases in the region, and dedicated IPC special-
ists must be present at the national, county and facility
level to ensure adherence to these essential quality prac-
tices. In addition, better coordination with the national
supply chain and investments in basic infrastructure for
power, water and sanitation are necessary to create a safe
environment for delivery of health services. Embracing
these practices will help institutionalize a culture of IPC in
the nation’s health system, and hopefully leave Liberia with
something positive from this national tragedy.
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